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Abstract 
In recent years, hedge funds have been increasingly active in carry trades, which typically 
involve considerable exposure to exchange rate movements. The lack of available data leads 
us to use less direct sources such as international bank lending data from the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) to infer some broad conclusions about recent developments 
related to hedge fund activities and carry trades. We find that the interest earnings of such 
trades have narrowed noticeably and have become inherently more risky. The unwinding of 
existing positions could prove to be disruptive for financial markets and appears to have 
contributed to volatility in currencies which are the destination for borrowed funds as well as 
the funding currencies themselves. 
1. Introduction 
Following a period of relative stability from 1980 to 1995, gross international capital mobility 
began to increase considerably relative to world output. While a number of distinct cycles 
around this general upward trend are evident, the most recent upswing in international 
capital movements is characterised by acceleration in bank lending and debt-related flows 
(Figure 1).
1  
The acceleration in debt-related flows is probably associated with the much discussed 
accumulation of reserve assets by countries in Asia and oil exporting countries, but the sharp 
rise in cross-border bank lending has received somewhat less attention. In part, these 
developments reflect opportunities brought about by unusually low nominal and real interest 
rates, as well as robust world economic growth in recent years. This has encouraged a 
greater degree of leverage and risk taking, reflected in the sharp rise in bank and money 
market capital flows. One example of these flows is the proliferation of carry trades, where 
funds are borrowed in low interest rate countries, such as Japan and Switzerland, and 
invested in markets where returns are higher, such as Australia, New Zealand, and a number 
of less developed countries. 
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1   Recent developments in global capital flows are discussed in Battellino (2006). 
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Hedge funds have been very active in carry trades and more generally foreign exchange as 
an asset class in recent years, as the opportunities in more traditional markets were curtailed 
by compressed volatility and generally low returns. While there is little direct data available 
on the activities of hedge funds, we use bank lending data published by the BIS to 
supplement information from Hedge Fund Research for the purpose of this paper. 
Several aspects of hedge fund activities may be of interest to policy makers. If it is correct 
that carry trades have been an important driver of cross-border bank lending, then a 
considerable portion of open positions currently in place are likely to have a greater than 
usual exposure to exchange rate fluctuations. As highly leveraged speculative positions can 
be more prone to sudden reversals than more fundamentally based investments, these might 
have a range of undesirable financial market and systemic consequences. The risks 
surrounding such outcomes are partly related to the prospects for theoretically appealing 
relationships such as uncovered interest parity to re-exert themselves. 
In this paper we bring together several data sources to gauge the current state of the hedge 
fund industry and focus particularly on some of the issues surrounding carry trade activities. 
The remainder of the paper is organised in the following way. Section 2 provides some 
background on the hedge fund industry. We briefly highlight recent growth in investor capital 
and leverage. Section 3 uses data from the BIS to estimate the carry a hedge fund borrowing 
in low interest rate countries is able to earn when investing in Australian and New Zealand 
fixed income. Section 4 raises some considerations with respect to exchange rate 
implications that may arise. Finally, Section 5 offers some brief concluding remarks. An 
appendix discusses how carry trades may be financed through derivatives. 
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 2.  Recent developments in the hedge fund industry 
Special purpose vehicles and hedge funds often locate themselves in offshore banking 
centres.
2 This is partly why reliable information about their activities is difficult to obtain, 
complicating the monitoring and regulation of the industry. As a result, indirect information is 
generally used for the most up-to-date indications of hedge fund activity. In the sections 
below, we use international bank lending data from the BIS to supplement data from Hedge 
Fund Research to make a number of broad analytical points about the industry. 
2.1  Growth in the hedge fund industry 
While hedge funds’ capital under management (ie investor capital) remains modest in 
comparison with the more traditional investment vehicles, such as pension and mutual funds, 
the comparatively active trading style of some funds and their extensive use of leverage has 
meant that their market impact can be important.
3 As systemically important institutions are 
the counterparties to hedge fund transactions, the industry’s activities also pose questions 
related to financial stability. Particularly strong growth in hedge fund capital under 
management has occurred in recent years. Investor capital has increased almost threefold 
between 2002 and March 2007, to well over US$1½ trillion. This has been accompanied by 
strong growth in ‘fund of funds’, which now account for around one-third of total hedge fund 










Hedge Fund Investor Capital
2007*
US$b
2004 2001 1998 1995
  Total hedge funds
  Fund of funds
Source: HFR Industry Reports
US$b
* Latest is March 2007
# Adjusted for Fund of funds double counting
#
1992
1 500 1 500
1 200 1 200
                                                
 
Solid net investor inflows from 2002 to 2004 may partly be a reflection of the global ‘search 
for yield’ over this period.
4 The view that investments in hedge funds can provide 
diversification benefits to more traditional portfolios also appears to have become more 
 
2   Hedge Fund Research data indicate that in mid-2006 around one-third of hedge funds were registered in the 
United States, with most of the remaining two-thirds domiciled in offshore banking centres. 
3   The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States recognised as far back as the late 
1960s that hedge funds ‘may raise special concerns with respect to their impact on securities markets’ (see 
SEC (2003)). 
4   See also RBA (2005). 
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 widespread, supporting the acceptance of hedge funds as a more mainstream investment. 
This is demonstrated by the substantial increase in the proportion of major global investors 
adding hedge fund investments to their portfolios.
5 However, re-invested returns have 
contributed the largest proportion to the increase in investor capital since 2002. 
There has also been strong growth in the number of hedge funds, with little noticeable 
change in the average fund size since the late 1990s despite strong growth in investor 
capital. In part, this is likely to be the result of ‘closed end funds’ that place limits on the 
investor capital that is accepted. The fragmentation of the industry has meant that there are 
probably fewer very large funds in operation than was the case 10 years ago. Insofar as it 
may be undesirable to have individual funds exert considerable influence over market prices, 
the average size of funds would appear to be less of an issue. Also, while the industry has 
become more important over the past 15 years, its investor capital remains less than one per 
cent of the total value of the world’s financial markets (Figure 3).
6 While this may suggest 
that the actions of individual funds are somewhat less of a concern, it may still be a problem 
that groups of smaller funds follow similar investment models and thus act collectively – even 
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In fact, however, over time the investment strategies of hedge funds appear to have become 
more diverse (Table 1). The outright importance of macro and equity non-hedge investment 
strategies has declined over time as mandates centring on equity hedge, event driven, and 
relative value arbitrage have become more prominent.
7 Nonetheless, the size of leverage, 
the dominance of hedge funds in the market for certain financial instruments (eg credit 
default swaps), and the link across strategies provided by the emergence of fund of funds 
complicate the analysis. If, for example, fund of funds were to only invest in managers 
pursuing macro strategies, then the importance of those strategies would not have changed 
as noticeably over the past decade. 
                                                  
5    See for example the Russell Survey on Alternative Investing, comprising data from 327 pension funds, 
endowments, and other tax-exempt institutions (Russell (2006)). 
6   The size of world financial markets is defined here by the total market value of government, corporate, and 
international bonds on issue, market capitalisation of world equities, and the value of total credit outstanding. 
7   Appendix A briefly describes what each of these strategies purports to achieve. 
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 Table 1 
Hedge Fund Investor Capital by Strategy 
Percentage of total investor capital 
  1996 2006 
Equity hedge  7.3 27.9 
Event driven  4.6 13.2 
Relative value arbitrage  1.5 12.9 
Macro  53.3 11.6 
Fixed income  5.7 8.1 
Sector  1.1 5.2 
Distressed securities  1.3 4.8 
Equity non-hedge  12.0 4.0 
Emerging markets  8.0 4.3 
Convertible arbitrage  0.5 3.1 
Equity market neutral  1.6 2.5 
Merger arbitrage  0.6 1.5 
Market timing  0.6 0.3 
Short selling  0.2 0.3 
Regulation D  0.1 0.2 
Fund of funds  20.5 44.8 
Memorandum items: 
Total investor capital was US$257 billion in 1996 and US$1,465 billion in 2006. 
Source: Hedge Fund Research. 
 
2.2  Hedge fund leverage 
Hedge funds generally use leverage to increase the return on the investor capital that they 
manage. While this strategy can multiply returns, it also multiplies risk by the same factor in 
the event that market prices move against the investment strategy. A hedge fund can 
achieve leverage in two main ways. The first is by borrowing outright, which is often known 
as ‘on-balance sheet’ leverage. The second is by using derivatives and other financial 
instruments to obtain exposure to an asset for a smaller outlay than the value of that asset, 
often referred to as ‘off-balance sheet’ leverage (eg margin and futures trading). 
Leverage is an important consideration when monitoring hedge fund activities for two main 
reasons. The first is that leverage increases the funds available for investment. Given the 
rapid growth in investor capital available to hedge funds, additional borrowing raises the 
potential market impact that positions could have. This is not to say that leveraged hedge 
fund investment would always and everywhere constitute a reason for concern. Secondly, 
since hedge funds may at times pursue very aggressive strategies to maximise profits (ie 
alpha) this may involve very high gearing ratios that expose funds to market movements that 
impose substantial losses. The concern here lies less with preventing a given fund from 
becoming insolvent, but rather with the deleterious impact that may be suffered by 
counterparties. Since systemically important organisations that fall within the net of prudential 
oversight are often the prime brokers or lenders to hedge funds, this issue is important from 
a financial stability perspective. 
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 The use of leverage by hedge funds has attracted particular attention since the collapse of 
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM). In early 1998 LTCM had investor capital of US$4.7 
billion, direct borrowings of US$129 billion, and off-balance sheet derivatives positions mainly 
in fixed income instruments with a notional value of US$1,250 billion. By late 1998, LTCM 
had lost US$4.6 billion in capital in the wake of the Russian debt default as this sudden 
unforeseen event drove market prices sharply against their outstanding positions. The high 
leverage of the fund was a key factor in its demise. Highlighting the broader systemic 
implications of the distressed fund, the Federal Reserve stepped in to mediate an organised 
dissolution of the fund between LTCM’s counterparties and prime brokers. 
2.2.1  Evidence of stricter lending practices 
Research by the BIS provides comprehensive estimates of total leverage of a subset of 
hedge funds.
8 The authors suggest their estimates of leverage to be most useful as a guide 
to trends in leverage over time rather than as a measure of actual levels, and conclude that 
leverage tended to be highest around 1997—98 but is now noticeably lower. These findings 
are consistent with reports that prime brokers required hedge funds to provide more 
collateral and imposed more stringent disclosure requirements starting in the late 1990s.
9 
The lengthening in the maturity profile of lending to offshore banking centres where hedge 
funds are prominent lends further support to the view that lending practices have become 
more discerning. 
2.2.2  Maturity profile of leverage 
Further useful information is to be gained by examining the maturity profile of the claims 
reported by the BIS. Since the mid—1990s, the maturity of borrowings has lengthened 
somewhat.
10 While around 60 per cent of claims were of a maturity of only up to and 
including one year in 1996, this share declined to less than 50 per cent at the beginning of 
2006 (Figure 4). Notably, the shift did not occur gradually over time, but relatively quickly in 
1998–99. 
It seems feasible that the end of financial turbulence following the Asian financial crisis and 
Russian debt default, which also coincides with the prominent failure of LTCM, contributed to 
this change. This may be because the more aggressive funds exited the industry, thereby 
changing the composition of finance, or that the investment behaviour of the industry 
changed for one reason or another. An important factor may also have been the tightening of 




                                                  
8   See McGuire et al (2005). 
9   Lenders would usually assess their potential exposure to hedge funds by calculating value at risk (VaR) for a 
typical period of 10 days, and set loss limits with a confidence interval of between 95 per cent and 99 per cent. 
Margin limits may also apply depending on factors such as liquidity, concentrations and how positions relate to 
the prime broker’s overall book. As funds engaged in fixed interest tend to have more counterparties to deal 
with, collateral arrangements may only cover losses at the 95 per cent interval. On the other hand, it would not 
be uncommon for prime brokers, who are typically more involved with equity markets, to maintain less than a 
one per cent uncollateralised exposure. For a more detailed description, refer to IMF (2004). 
10   The BIS report maturity as (i) less than or equal to one year, (ii) greater than one year but less than or equal to 
two years, and (iii) greater than two years. We apportion the sizable ‘unallocated’ component equally among 
the three categories and define ‘short-term’ as being loans with maturity of less than or equal to one year. All 
remaining claims are deemed to be ‘longer-term’. 
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2.2.3  Indirect measures of on-balance sheet leverage 
Given the scarcity of data relating to the notional value of derivatives outstanding, it is very 
difficult to make sensible estimates of the likely extent of off-balance sheet leverage at the 
disposal of hedge funds (Appendix B discusses the relationship between Japanese banks’ 
derivatives and financing of carry trades). However, the foreign claims of BIS reporting banks 
on offshore banking centres can be used as a broad indication of the on-balance sheet 
leverage of hedge funds.
11 The main countries’ lending to areas where hedge funds are 
domiciled accelerated sharply at the beginning of 2004 (Figure 5).
12  
To put this into context, bank lending to Caribbean and European offshore banking centres 
increased by around US$370 billion, from US$880 billion to US$1,247 billion between 2004 
and 2006 (Table 2). Alternatively, this can be thought of as lending to hedge funds at an 
average annualised rate exceeding 25 per cent. At this rapid rate, the claims of BIS reporting 
banks on offshore centres increased in importance to the total foreign claims of these banks. 
In 2004 claims on offshore centres were around 4½ per cent of total claims, but this share 






                                                  
11  While it is true that direct lending to hedge funds is best captured by the non-bank segment, it is also likely 
that some lending to banks in offshore centres is then channelled into hedge funds. As a result, we do not 
make a distinction between lending to banks and non-banks for the purpose of this paper. A detailed 
discussion of institutions domiciled in offshore centres and their activities is given in Dixon (2001). 
12  Note that we convert the BIS data from US dollars into Special Drawing Rights (SDR) to avoid possible 
distortions emanating from trends in the US dollar. Given the pronounced weakness in the US dollar over 
2003, the point of inflection shown would be shifted forward in time to early 2003. 
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BIS Banks’ Foreign Claims on Offshore Banking Centres 
US$ billion 
  March 2004  December 2006 
Euro area  306.8  402.9 
Japan 225.0  267.7 
Switzerland 127.5  159.6 
United Kingdom  97.6  184.9 
United States  20.6  77.4 
Other banks’ claims  102.4  154.2 
Total 880.0  1,246.8 
Memorandum items: 
Offshore banking centres are defined here to encompass Aruba, Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, 
Netherland Antilles, Panama, West Indies UK, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Isle of Man, and Jersey. These figures 
therefore exclude foreign claims on Hong Kong SAR and Singapore, which together amounted to 
US$546  billion in December 2006. Also excluded are the much smaller centres of Lebanon, Macau SAR, 
Mauritius, Samoa, Singapore, and Vanuatu. 
Source: Hedge Fund Research. 
 
Notwithstanding that there have been large increases in lending to offshore centres from 
banks located in the euro area, the United Kingdom and the United States, this lending does 
not represent an increase in the relative importance of hedge fund financing for these 
countries (Figure 6). That is, overall cross-border lending by banks has grown at the same 
rate as lending to offshore banking centres. Only for Japan and Switzerland has lending to 
offshore banking centres gained a significantly more prominent share of total cross-border 
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 We infer from the unusually low policy and lending rates that have persisted in Japan and 
Switzerland for some time that these findings are to be expected. Furthermore, these data 
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2.2.4  Investor capital and leverage 
The data available from Hedge Fund Research on the investor capital of offshore hedge 
funds provides a close approximation of the subset of funds not domiciled in the United 
States, for which BIS lending data is available.
14 The contribution made by using this data is 
to provide an approximation of the actual level of on-balance sheet leverage. Thereby we 
also derive a better calibration of the size of positions held by hedge funds. 
Figure 7 shows lending to offshore banking centres and offshore hedge funds’ investor 
capital. There is some evidence to suggest that leverage expands broadly in line with 
investor capital, with the ratio of total borrowings to total investor capital little changed since 
the mid—1990s. However, it is instructive to note that this ratio tended to be around the 
highest in 1997 and 1998, which is similar to the findings of the BIS in McGuire et al (2005). 
Together, the bank lending figures and investor capital of offshore hedge funds provide a 
conservative estimate of the total funds invested by offshore hedge funds. As at the end of 
2006 this figure was over US$2 trillion, showing that offshore hedge funds were investing in 
assets far in excess of their investor capital of US$1,150 billion at that time. Taking into 
account that additional funds are domiciled in the United States, and the industry’s 
aggressive use of off-balance sheet leverage, the total positions managed by hedge funds is 
likely to exceed these estimates substantially. 
 
                                                  
13   Lending by banks not domiciled in Japan or Switzerland, but denominated in yen and francs, strengthens this 
result. 
14  A little under 90 per cent of these funds are domiciled in the same set of countries as the offshore banking 
centres from the BIS dataset. 
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3.  The cost of finance and carry trade activity 
Given that little information is available on carry trade-related capital movements, we attempt 
to calculate some of the key decision variables to gain an understanding of hedge fund 
behaviour. This is of particular interest as the profitability of carry trades directly violates the 
theoretical underpinnings of uncovered interest parity (UIP). 
3.1  Calculating the cost of finance 
Using the BIS data on the value and maturity of Japanese and Swiss bank claims on the 
Cayman Islands, we construct a weighted average cost at which hedge funds may finance 
carry trades.
15 We restrict the exercise to Japan and Switzerland since the increase in their 
lending to offshore banking centres has increased noticeably as a share of their total 
international claims. Furthermore, we are more confident that their lending to offshore 
centres is largely denominated in their local currency (ie yen and francs) given their low 
                                                  







t t i ) 1 ( α α β
15   The simple arithmetic for this calculation is given by:    
where: 
it = the weighted average rate at which banks in Japan and Switzerland lend to hedge funds in the Cayman 
Islands at time t. 
j = the two financing countries, Japan and Switzerland. 
β  = country j’s share in total lending to the Cayman Islands by Japan and Switzerland at time t. 
j
t
αt = the share of total claims on the Cayman Islands that is short-term (ie less than one year). 





t = a representative long-term interest rate (two-year) for country j at time t. 
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 interest rates compared with other countries in recent years. While banks in Europe and the 
United States have also substantially increased their lending to hedge funds, we are less 
certain of the currency denomination of that lending. The weighted average rate at which 
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After fluctuating between ¾ to 1 per cent in the mid-1990s, interest rates began to decline in 
1998—99, before rising back to 1 per cent in late 2000. From then, a gradual fall in interest 
rates began that saw a trough below 0.2 per cent in mid-2003. In 2004 and into 2005, 
average interest rates in Japan and Switzerland remained unusually low at around ¼ of one 
percentage point. Following the general pick up in economic activity and to a lesser extent 
inflation over the last two years, central banks in Japan and Switzerland began to normalise 
policy rates, leading to the gradual increase in rates observed to date. Accordingly, the 
financing cost faced by hedge funds has now risen above 1¼ per cent for the first time in 
more than a decade. 
3.2  Carry against Australia and New Zealand 
Given the resilience of the Australian and New Zealand economies to the global downturn in 
this cycle, interest rates in these countries were not cut to the unusually low levels that 
prevailed in other industrialised countries. As a result, Australia, New Zealand, and a number 
of less developed countries were natural destinations for carry trade investments over recent 
years. To calculate a yield that hedge funds may have earned on carry trades, we take the 
unweighted average of 10-year government bond yields in Australia and New Zealand.
16 
This carry trade yield and the associated financing cost, along with the corresponding spread 




                                                  
16  The resulting spread includes the duration risk implicit from borrowing at the short end of the yield curve to 
finance investment at the long end. While this may have important implications for the investment, we leave 
these aside for the purposes of this paper. 
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In the second half of the 1990s, the carry was primarily driven by developments in the yield 
that could be earned rather than the cost of finance. However, the persistent decline in the 
financing cost began to boost returns from around 2001. Most notable is that since mid-2005 
the carry has fallen significantly, not because of a decline in the yields earned, but mainly 
because the financing cost has risen considerably. 
4.  Exchange rate considerations 
An important aspect of the nature of carry trades is that the foreign currency exposure 
resulting from raising a liability in one currency to fund an investment in another is either not 
hedged at all against exchange rate changes, or hedged less than the usual cross-border 
debt exposure.
17 As a result, the risk to carry trade positions implied by exchange rate 
changes is substantial and can vary significantly over time. This risk is amplified further by 
the high degree of leverage employed by hedge funds, which can mean that even a small 
narrowing in spreads or exchange rate movements will trigger margin calls. Conversely, the 
capital flows associated with substantial carry trade positions can have important implications 
for exchange rates themselves. 
4.1  Carry trade exposure to exchange rate changes 
Persistent interest rate differentials are not competed away by the free movement of capital 
between the countries in question – not even in the long term. However, this observation is 
insufficient to explain the ex ante expectation that carry trades would be profitable. That is, if 
we subscribe to the theoretical idea of UIP, where interest rate differentials can only persist if 
 
17   Fully hedging the foreign exchange exposure would involve giving up the carry earned on the debt investment. 
For a detailed explanation of foreign exchange hedging practices and exposures, see Becker and Fabbro 
(2006). 
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 expected exchange rate changes offset them fully, then carry trades should not be 
profitable.
18  
Part of the explanation of why investors continue to pursue carry trades may be that there is 
a very wide dispersion of expectations about the direction, timing and magnitude of 
exchange rate changes. Short- to medium-term deviations from UIP may therefore give rise 
to the capital flows that seek to profit from the combination of interest rate and exchange rate 
movements. Interestingly, unhedged capital flows from low to high interest rate countries 
place upward pressure on the exchange rate of the high interest rate country. Once again, 
this is in direct conflict with UIP, where interest rate differentials are often interpreted as an 
indication of expected depreciation in the high interest rate country’s exchange rate.
19 The 
2003 experience in the Australian and New Zealand dollars provides a convenient example 
of the violation of UIP (Figure 10). While there was a large interest rate differential favouring 
Australia and New Zealand over Japan and Switzerland, and UIP would predict either for that 
differential to be competed away or for the high interest rate currencies to depreciate against 
the low interest rate currencies, neither happened. The interest rate differential of around 5 
percentage points in 2003 was further supplemented by the appreciation of the Australian 
and New Zealand dollars of around 15 per cent. In that year carry trades were very profitable 
and UIP failed. 
More recently, notwithstanding the ongoing narrowing in interest rate differentials, carry 
trades have again become very profitable due to weakness in the Japanese yen and strength 
in the Australian and New Zealand dollars. As the speculative positions of traders get longer 
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18   As a reminder, UIP postulates that the domestic interest rate is equal to the foreign interest rate adjusted for 
expected exchange rate changes (i
d = i* + Δs
e). 
19   Refer to Plantin and Shin (2006) for a detailed examination of how asset prices whose value is sensitive to the 
flow of funds into the market may be driven further away from fundamentals. 
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 However, because hedge funds characteristically employ a very active management style for 
their leveraged investments, a number of other considerations affect their carry trade 
decisions. Thus, while it is likely that there will be persistent interest rate differentials 
between countries like Australia and Japan, the attractiveness of a carry trade opportunity 
will diminish as the total return declines. Therefore, carry trade activity will be sensitive to 
‘changes’ in the rate of return, as well as the return itself. As a result, those hedge funds 
whose investments are most sensitive to returns will commence the unwinding of their carry 
trade positions as total returns begin to narrow. 
Narrowing returns and increased exchange rate volatility in the past 12 months have seen 
risks begin to move against carry trades. In order to gauge the risk exposure of hedge funds 
to exchange rate movements, the average absolute percentage change of a number of 




Volatility of the Japanese Yen 
Average absolute percentage change, 1995 to 2005 
 Daily  Monthly  Quarterly  Yearly 
A$ per Yen  0.6  2.9  5.4  9.9 
NZ$ per Yen  0.6  2.8  5.3  12.0 
US$ per Yen  0.5  2.5  4.8  9.6 
Sources: RBA and Reuters. 
 
The current ‘annualised’ carry calculated earlier is around 4¾ percentage points. Since the 
Japanese yen moves half of one percentage point over an average day, this annualised 
return could be offset by the exchange rate in just 10 days if the yen were to gather upward 
momentum. Even if there is no strong uptrend in the yen, within the scope of the average 
month exchange rate movements can substantially reduce the profitability of an existing 
position. However, the importance of volatility has some notable asymmetric characteristics. 
While funds are probably willing to tolerate rising volatility around a trend in the exchange 
rate that moves in their favour, they are more likely to be constrained by volatility at times 
when UIP is widely expected to reassert itself. 
4.2  Carry trades as a source of exchange rate changes 
While hedge funds have an exposure to exchange rate variations, their positions in 
themselves are at times sufficiently large to cause volatility in foreign exchange markets. This 
is usually most evident when substantial positions that have built up over a period of time are 
reversed quickly. This may come about when aforementioned unfavourable exchange rate or 
interest rate changes trigger some repatriation of investments. Since these flows tend to 
further push the exchange rate against the profitability of carry trades, they often trigger 
additional liquidations, and so on. Another reason for such reversals may be an event that 
triggers a bout of general risk aversion. In such situations, the unruly unwinding of positions 
by speculative accounts may result in or exacerbate undesirable financial market volatility. 
In March 2006, this type of scenario appeared to play out as hedge funds reversed 
substantial carry trade positions. The New Zealand dollar, Icelandic krona, and the 
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 20 currencies of a number of less developed countries were most affected.  Since these 
currencies are significantly less liquid than the major six currencies in the world, the 
movements were further exacerbated.
21 Exchange rate volatility therefore represents an 
important risk for the profitability of carry trades, and in turn the large international capital 
movements involved also have implications for exchange rate volatility itself. 
The evolution of volatility in the New Zealand dollar over recent years is therefore likely to be 
at least in part due to capital flows that seek the higher rate of return of local debt 
instruments. Following a period of below average volatility in 2004 and 2005, the New 
Zealand dollar began to fluctuate more widely against the Japanese yen (Figure 11). Around 
this time, it was evident that speculative activity was playing an important part in dictating the 
direction of the exchange rate.
22 The gross turnover in capital flows at around this time was 

















NZ$ per Yen Volatility
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At around the same time, volatility in the Australian dollar against the Japanese yen began to 
rise from its lows to more normal levels. However, there is less evidence of significant or 
persistent volatility (Figure 12). Perhaps the Australian dollar’s high liquidity in global foreign 




                                                  
20   For a description, see RBA (2006). 
21   In order of importance, the major six currency pairs against the US dollar in 2004 were European euro, 
Japanese yen, United Kingdom pound sterling, Australian dollar, Swiss franc, and Canadian dollar. See also 
BIS (2005). 
22  In the case of New Zealand and Australia, the flow of unhedged retail investments from Japan into local 
currency denominated debt instruments (‘uridashi’) are also an important type of capital flow. However, since 
these funds are rarely borrowed, they are somewhat different to the carry trades discussed here. 
23   Importantly, the episode of volatility that followed in March 2007 was mainly driven by factors influencing the 
Japanese yen rather than the destination currencies. General risk retrenchment at around that time saw 
unwinding of carry trades that gave rise to volatility in the USD/JPY rate and the NZD/USD rate. The 
AUD/USD rate, on the other hand, remained relatively unaffected. 
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Another important aspect of how the risk profile of carry trades has evolved concerns the 
implicit guarantees that were in place as a result of expansionary policies in some countries. 
This was especially the case in Japan. For domestic policy reasons, the Bank of Japan had 
long enunciated its commitment to maintaining the policy rate at zero to ensure an end to 
domestic deflation. This also ensured that the financing cost for carry trades was reliably tied 
to evidence that the Japanese economy was recovering. Furthermore, as the Japanese 
authorities undertook substantial exchange rate intervention to prevent the appreciation of 
the yen against the US dollar in 2003 and 2004, another guarantee had been put in place to 
mitigate the risk of entering into carry trades. For a while, carry trades financed in Japanese 
yen were almost a one-way bet as the authorities appeared to limit both the interest rate and 
currency risk. Both of these implicit guarantees have since been removed. 
5. Conclusion 
Narrowing returns on carry trades may make it increasingly difficult for highly leveraged 
hedge funds to sustain their current positions. As a result, the risk of an unruly unwinding of 
positions has risen. If this process is rapid or extensive enough, then it could cause some 
disruption to global financial markets. 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that the unwinding of carry trade positions may have already 
had a significant impact on foreign exchange markets. Much of the depreciation seen in the 
Australian, New Zealand, and Icelandic currencies in March 2006 was directly related to this 
type of activity. 
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 Appendix A:  ‘Hedge Fund Research’ strategy groups 
Convertible arbitrage – involves purchasing a portfolio of convertible securities, generally 
convertible bonds, and hedging a portion of the equity risk by selling short the underlying 
common stock. 
Distressed securities – strategies invest in, and may sell short, the securities of companies 
where the security's price has been, or is expected to be, affected by a distressed situation. 
This may involve reorganisations, bankruptcies, distressed sales, and other corporate 
restructurings. 
Emerging markets – funds invest in securities of companies or the sovereign debt of 
developing or emerging countries. Investments are primarily long. Emerging markets include 
countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Africa, and parts of 
Asia. 
Equity hedge – investing consists of a core holding of long equities hedged at all times with 
short sales of stocks and/or stock index options. Some managers maintain a substantial 
portion of assets within a hedged structure and commonly employ leverage. Conservative 
funds mitigate market risk by maintaining market exposure from zero to 100 per cent. 
Aggressive funds may magnify market risk by exceeding 100 per cent exposure and, in some 
instances, maintain a short exposure. In addition to equities, some funds may have limited 
assets invested in other types of securities. 
Equity market neutral – investing seeks to profit by exploiting pricing inefficiencies between 
related equity securities, neutralising exposure to market risk by combining long and short 
positions. 
Equity non-hedge – funds are predominately long equities although they have the ability to 
hedge with short sales of stocks and/or stock index options. These funds are commonly 
known as ‘stock-pickers’. The important distinction between equity non-hedge funds and 
equity hedge funds is that equity non-hedge funds do not always have a hedge in place. In 
addition to equities, some funds may have limited assets invested in other types of securities. 
Event-driven – is also known as ‘corporate life cycle’ investing. This involves investing in 
opportunities created by significant transactional events, such as spin-offs, mergers and 
acquisitions, bankruptcy reorganisations, recapitalisations, and share buybacks. Instruments 
include long and short common and preferred stocks, as well as debt securities and options. 
Fixed income: arbitrage – a market neutral hedging strategy that seeks to profit by 
exploiting pricing inefficiencies between related fixed income securities while neutralising 
exposure to interest rate risk. 
Fixed income: convertible bonds – these funds are primarily long only convertible bonds. 
Convertible bonds have both fixed income and equity characteristics. 
Fixed income: diversified – these funds may invest in a variety of fixed income strategies. 
While many invest in multiple strategies, others may focus on a single strategy less followed 
by most fixed income hedge funds. Areas of focus include municipal bonds, corporate bonds, 
and global fixed income securities. 
Fixed income: high-yield – these managers invest in non-investment grade debt. 
Objectives may range from high current income to acquisition of undervalued instruments. 
Emphasis is placed on assessing credit risk of the issuer. 
Fixed income: mortgage-backed – these funds invest in mortgage-backed securities. Many 
funds focus solely on AAA-rated bonds. 
Macro – involves investing by making leveraged bets on anticipated price movements of 
stock markets, interest rates, foreign exchange, and physical commodities. Macro managers 
employ a ‘top-down’ global approach, and may invest in any markets using any instruments 
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 to participate in expected market movements. These movements may result from forecasted 
shifts in world economies, political fortunes, or global supply and demand for resources, both 
physical and financial. 
Market timing – involves allocating assets among investments by switching into investments 
that appear to be beginning an uptrend, and switching out of investments that appear to be 
starting a downtrend. This primarily consists of switching between mutual funds and money 
markets. Typically, technical trend-following indicators are used to determine the direction of 
a fund and identify buy and sell signals. 
Merger arbitrage – sometimes called risk arbitrage, involves investment in event-driven 
situations such as leveraged buy-outs, mergers, and hostile takeovers. 
Regulation D – invest in Regulation D securities, sometimes referred to as structured 
discount convertibles. The securities are privately offered to the investment manager by 
companies in need of timely financing and the terms are negotiated. Once a deal is closed, 
there is a waiting period for the private share offering to be registered with the SEC. The 
manager can only convert into private shares and cannot trade them publicly during this 
period; therefore their investment is illiquid until it becomes registered. Managers will hedge 
with common stock until the registration becomes effective and then liquidate the position 
gradually. 
Relative value arbitrage – attempts to take advantage of relative pricing discrepancies 
between instruments including equities, debt, options, and futures. Managers may use 
mathematical, fundamental, or technical analysis to determine misvaluations. Securities may 
be mispriced relative to the underlying security, related securities, groups of securities, or the 
overall market. 
Source:  Hedge Fund Research, ‘HFR Industry Reports’, various issues, 
www.hedgefundresearch.com. 
Appendix B:  A possible link between Japanese banks’ balance sheets 
and derivatives-based financing of carry trades 
As is the case in most other developed countries, banks in Japan fully hedge their on-
balance sheet foreign currency exposure.
24 While there are no direct data available on off-
balance sheet derivatives, trends in on-balance sheet items can be used to infer some 
important aspects of how Japanese banks choose to lend.
25  
In recent years, an important trend that has developed is that Japanese banks have 
substantially added to their external net long-term asset position denominated in foreign 
currency (Figure B1). This has more than offset their external net liability position in short-
term foreign currency instruments. Consequently, Japanese banks have accumulated a 
widening overall external net asset position. 
                                                  
24  Compliance with Basel accords ensures that capital is set against open foreign currency positions to cover 
risk. However, this tends to be relatively expensive and banks generally opt to hedge their foreign exchange 
exposures through natural hedges or derivatives. See also Becker and Fabbro (2006). 
25   The source of yen for the rest of the world must be the Japanese banking system or the Bank of Japan. Even 
if the yen are not directly sourced from Japanese residents, they have to originate from a transaction in Japan. 
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 This open foreign currency position implies exposure to movements in the Japanese yen, 
which is unlikely to exist because banks hedge these exposures.
26 An investigation of how 
Japanese banks are accumulating foreign currency assets, while hedging the implied 
exposure to movements in the yen, yields important indirect evidence of the use of 
derivatives in funding yen denominated lending to non-residents. 
Japanese banks could be issuing foreign currency debt to fund their acquisition of foreign 
currency assets. This would imply equal amounts of foreign currency assets and liabilities 
which provide a hedge against foreign exchange risk. However, this cannot be the case 
because the net asset position indicates that assets exceed liabilities. 
Alternatively, Japanese banks awash with domestic liquidity could be converting yen in the 
foreign exchange spot market to acquire foreign assets and then hedge these through 
derivative transactions in forwards or options. Again, this seems unlikely as these types of 
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We therefore suggest that Japanese banks are swapping their ample yen liquidity into 
foreign currencies, thereby selling yen in the near leg of the swap and repurchasing it in the 
far leg. This amounts to a yen denominated loan for the duration of the foreign exchange 
swap taken out by the counterparty to the transaction (eg a prime broker to hedge funds). 
Simultaneously, Japanese banks therefore borrow foreign currency for the duration of the 
swap and invest the proceeds in long-term foreign assets (eg US bonds). Importantly, since 
the terms of the second leg of the swap and the exchange rate are agreed at the time the 
contract is entered into, Japanese banks are not taking on the foreign exchange risk 
associated with fluctuations in the yen for the duration of the swap. 
This explanation is appealing because it accounts for how yen liquidity is converted into 
foreign currency, how foreign assets are accumulated, and how this apparently open foreign 
currency position is in fact hedged against fluctuations in the yen. It also happens to be 
consistent with carry trade financing for which there is little evidence to be found in traditional 
measures that rely on on-balance sheet measures such as bank lending and capital flows. 
                                                  
26  There is no indication that Japanese banks are setting aside more capital against open foreign currency 
positions (despite the rising proportion of assets held in foreign currencies), which implies that these positions 
are hedged to comply with regulatory standards (see Bank of Japan (2007)). 
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